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ABSTRACT
Successful malware attacks on information technology systems can
cause millions of dollars in damage, the exposure of sensitive and
private information, and the irreversible destruction of data. Anti-
virus systems that analyze a file’s contents use a combination of
static and dynamic analysis to detect and remove/remediate such
malware. However, examining a file’s entire contents is not always
possible in practice, as the volume and velocity of incoming data
may be too high, or access to the underlying file contents may be
restricted or unavailable. If it were possible to obtain estimates of a
file’s relative likelihood of being malicious without looking at the
file contents, we could better prioritize file processing order and
aid analysts in situations where a file is unavailable.
In this work, we demonstrate that file names can contain infor-
mation predictive of the presence of malware in a file. In particu-
lar, we show the effectiveness of a character-level convolutional
neural network at predicting malware status using file names on
Endgame’s EMBER malware detection benchmark dataset.
1 INTRODUCTION
Organizations in government and industry increasingly rely on in-
formation technology (IT), digitized data, and networked computer
assets. Consequently, they face a growing risk of exposure to cyber
attacks (i.e., malicious attempts at stealing, altering, or destroying
IT systems and data). Yet, as computer networks grow in size, so do
the challenges cybersecurity professionals face in securing them.
With more connected devices, more users, and more complex sys-
tems, adversarial attack opportunities increase exponentially. In
2018, on average, large organizations took almost 200 days to iden-
tify a cyber breach and almost 70 days to contain those breaches
once they were identified [22].
Malicious software (malware) is one of the most common meth-
ods adversaries use to exploit computer networks. Generally, malware-
based attacks use manipulated software to intentionally cause dam-
age or access data. A single successful malware attack can result in
millions of dollars in damages, with recent annual financial impact
measured to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars [3, 12]. Each
day, adversaries design new and increasingly complex malware
systems, challenging security professionals to deploy robust and
effective counter measures.
As a result, malware detectors have become a critical compo-
nent of a cybersecurity strategy. Traditionally, anti-virus systems
used signature-driven systems (i.e., systems that looked for spe-
cific software known to be malicious) to detect malware [28]. More
recently, dynamic software analysis has become increasingly pop-
ular, where evaluated software is run in a secure environment to
directly observe whether or not it behaves maliciously [10]. While
powerful, anti-virus and dynamic analysis tools have limitations.
These methods can be (1) time consuming, when the data volume
and velocity are high [25], and (2) operationally intractable, when
access to original files may be restricted due to data sensitivity,
storage limitations, or the nature of tools themselves. Therefore,
organizations may use analytic methods that are based only on file
metadata to prioritize deeper analysis or even as the sole method
of analysis. While this can increase the efficiency of cybersecurity
operations under most conditions, it is also essential when the file
itself cannot be examined.
For example, during incident response, cyber protection teams
(CPTs) may need to evaluate data on a disconnected, edge network,
where connectivity restrictions may prohibit the exfiltration of data
into an enterprise analytic environment. Under these conditions,
CPTs will bring separate analytic tool kits, with limited compute, to
securely assess data using techniques that will not expose the kits
themselves to compromise (e.g., without accessing raw executables).
Methods must evaluate large volumes of data using inference en-
gines that are computationally-efficient and based on the minimal
amount of information possible, mitigating compromise expansion
risk and rapidly flagging the most-likely malware culprits.
Additionally, organizations may deploy these methods when:
(1) New external hard drives or thumb drives are connected to
a network computer. There may be thousands of new files
on these external drives, where comprehensive scans will
take time and slow down the drive, potentially interfering
with work.
(2) Network operators want to sample files from the network to
check for potential malicious content. Downloading all files
off of any individual machine may put too much strain on
the network, meaning only a subset of files can be selected
from any machine. Sampling files randomly from any given
machine is unlikely to be effective, as recent work has esti-
mated benign files to outnumber malicious ones at a ratio of
80:1 [18].
(3) Security professionals begin a forensic investigation into
destructive malware or corrupted storage media, In many
cases, it may not be possible to recover working or complete
versions of the files on a system. File metadata is often more
likely to remain intact.
Therefore, in this work, we aim to explore whether file names
are predictive of malware. Though evaluating maliciousness based
on file names may not be definitive, it may help inform investi-
gations and support organizations when complete file analysis is
intractable.
For many reasons, the predictive nature of filenames is a reason-
able hypothesis. First and foremost, naming software in a descrip-
tive manner is generally considered a “software engineering best
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practice.” As such, we suspect the habitual behavior of software de-
velopers may lead to valuable information leakage into file names.
Furthermore, for small-scale, targeted malware attacks, file names
are likely to be well-designed by adversaries to mask the malware.
However, in large-scale malware attacks, where the manual speci-
fication of file names is not feasible, adversaries are likely to use
algorithmic name generation techniques using structured routines.
This may create patterns in malicious file names.
In this work, we demonstrate that a file’s name contains predic-
tive information about its maliciousness. While we do not propose
this method as a replacement for anti-virus solutions, it can be a
valuable tool for security professionals when resources or informa-
tion are constrained. The related work to our own will be discussed
in section 2, followed by the data used in section 3. Our method-
ology will be discussed in section 4, where we specify the models
we evaluate and the design choices for our solution. In section 5
we will review the results of our method, where we show that file
names are surprisingly accurate and investigate their utility. To
confirm our method has not inadvertently relied on inappropriate
information, we perform a cluster and visualization analysis of our
model in section 6. Finally, we will conclude in section 7.
2 RELATEDWORK
Using contextual information alone to predict a file’s maliciousness
has been a small but relatively successful endeavor. Two primary
approaches have been used. Chau et al. [6] introduced file-source
context, where the reputation of both files and machines are com-
bined to make a contextual graph. Propagating through this graph
can infer benign/malicious likelihoods for new files based on the
machines on which they are found. Ye et al. [29] introduced an ap-
proach based on file co-occurrence, as new files are often deployed
onto a machine in groups, coming from a similar archival file (e.g., a
zip, tar, or msi file). Here, archive source information and individual
file maliciousness is used to create contextual graphs, which infor-
mation is once again propagated through to infer maliciousness for
new files.
Both graph-based approaches have been improved further, [11,
16, 27] as they are valuable to network defense. Though they enable
file evaluation and prioritization with efficiency and scale, they
also experience limitations. The information needed is generally
only available to anti-virus companies with large repositories of
data, making external replication and implementation difficult. Our
approach of using file names is the first contextual feature that can
be readily replicated by others, as file name information can be
obtained publicly from VirusTotal reports [1], which are included
with the public EMBER dataset.
Demetrio et al. [9] and Coull and Gardner [8] have both evalu-
ated the efficacy of deep learning methods, namely [23], for mal-
ware detection from raw byte code. While they reach diverging
conclusions over algorithmic learning, both agree that metadata in-
formation, which does not necessarily cause maliciousness, is used
to make predictions. This similarly suggests non-causative infor-
mation that is useful for prediction may be present in file names.
Simultaneously with our work, a pre-print by Kyadige et al. [17]
demonstrates that malware detection can be improved through the
examination of the file path context1. In particular, they show that
deep neural networks benefit from file path context when predicting
maliciousness, even though file path structure is not necessarily
related to the malware itself.
Though ourwork uses similar information as the aforementioned
research, there are a number of pertinent differences. First, by using
file paths as a foundation, Kyadige et al. rely on information that is
not generally accessible (outside of anti-virus companies with large
customer sets). Our use of only file name (e.g., just “evil.exe”) makes
our work immediately reproducible with a Virus Total report. The
use of file paths may also be limited in some circumstances (e.g.,
when a file intercepted over a network does not yet have a file path,
though it does have a file name), and the subsequent methods may
be sensitive to where a file resides (e.g., on an external drive or after
a file was copied to a system). Generally, Kyadige et al. focus on the
evaluation and design of a full anti-virus system, while our work is
motivated by different objectives, as discussed in section 1.
3 DATA
We use the EMBER data set from Anderson and Roth [2], an open
source data set of over a million portable executable file (PE file)
sha256 hashes scanned by VirusTotal in 2017. The data set includes
metadata, features derived from the PE files, and a benchmark
model trained on those derived features. In addition to the pub-
licly available EMBER data set, we used the reports generated by
VirusTotal to extract the file names associated with each PE file,
which are found under the submission_names field of the reports.
Data lacking file names were dropped, and when multiple names
were associated with a file, the first was used. Additionally, unla-
beled data in the training set was dropped. After initial analysis,
we found a number of files that where easily classified in bulk due
to malware related names being appended to the original name. To
avoid biasing our results with potentially unrealistic true-positive
rates, we dropped data with file names containing substrings vir,
mal, and hack. In these cases, it is possible that VirusTotal users
uploaded files with names modified to include the malware or virus
labels. Further investigation did not reveal other large-scale naming
conventions that may have been caused by users uploading known
malware.
3.1 Data Properties
After processing, the training data consisted of 284,999 benign
files and 185,615 malicious files, and the test data consisted of
99,204 benign files and 84,086 malicious files. Example file names
for each class can be found in Table 1. Below, we examine some
characteristics of the file names found in the training data.
Figure 1 is a histogram of file name character lengths in the
training data for each class. It can be observed that the number of
files of a certain length decreases exponentially as the length of the
file name increases. Benign and malicious files both have similar
name length distributions.
Figure 2 shows the frequencies of the characters found in the
training data for each class. Benign and malicious files have nearly
1e.g., C:\Documents\Files\evil.exe
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identical frequency characteristics. It can be observed that the ma-
jority of the file names are composed of a small number of charac-
ters.
In the training set, 307 unique characters appear in the malware
class that do not appear in the benign class, and only a tiny fraction,
0.11%, of the malware instances contain one of these malware-
unique characters. Conversely, 621 characters appear in the benign
class that do not appear in the malware class, and 0.10% of the
benign instances contain one of these benign-unique characters. 417
characters appear in both classes. We note that only about a tenth
of a percent of the training data contains one of these class-unique
characters, and most of the class-unique characters are non-ASCII
special characters or characters from non-Latin writing systems.
The low frequency and the makeup of these class-unique characters
suggests that their presence in the data is not abnormal, given that
the EMBER data set was built using files submitted to VirusTotal.
A vocabulary size Vsize is specified at training time to limit
the characters processed to the Vsize most frequent characters. At
prediction time, characters that are not part of the vocabulary are
ignored.
Table 1: Example file names for each class.
File Name
Benign d3d9.dll
e5b355a6c7cb37ba88f6a6daa61fce5f
iexplore.exe
wmiutils.dll
winscp
Malware ctvqzym.exe
adobe_epic.dll
img002.exe
servicess
Sennepsfabrikkernes0
Figure 1: Histogram of file name character lengths in the
training data. The count densities are log scale. The number
of file names of a certain length decreases exponentially as
the length increases.
Figure 2: Frequency of the characters found in the training
data. The frequency is log scale.
4 METHODOLOGY
In this work, we evaluate two models that are based solely on file
names. First, as a base-line, we consider a Logistic Regression clas-
sifier. While it performs well, we see that greater accuracy can be
achieved by applying a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN). As
file names are neither causative nor directly informative of mali-
cious behavior and can be easily modified for adversarial attacks
[4], it would not be wise to use these methods for comprehensive
malware defense. Rather, this method would be used to prioritize
deeper file evaluation or to act as an indicator of compromise (IOC)
when raw files are unavailable. A normal anti-virus product, cre-
ated for comprehensive defense, would be evaluated based on recall
at low false-positive rates (e.g., 10−3 to 10−5). As our method has
alternate objectives, we use Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) as
our primary performance metric. Generally, this score corresponds
to the quality of a ranking of all malicious files with a score higher
than all benign files, which is an appropriate criterion for our ap-
plication [7]. We also consider the F1-score as a generic balance
between precision and recall, as we may not necessarily prefer one
over the other (in contrast to a normal anti-virus product).
4.1 Logistic Regression
As baselines, we use a binary 3-gram character embedding in combi-
nationwith a L2-regularized logistic regression and a L1-regularized
logistic regression. Both methods are characterized by the objective
function in Equation 1, where R(w) = ∥w ∥1 produces L1 regular-
ization, and R(w) = 12 ∥w ∥22 results in L2 regularization.
f (w) = R(w) +C
N∑
i=1
log
(
1 + exp
(−y ·w⊤xi ) ) (1)
The 3-gram character embedding results in a 163177-dimensional
feature space. The sparsity of the vectorized training data is 99.99%,
where sparsity is defined as the number of zero-valued elements
divided by the total number of elements in the data matrix. The
sparsity of the data urges L1-regularization, which tends to improve
predictive performance on extremely sparse data [21]. We also
evaluate L2-regularization for completeness.
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The logistic regression regularization strengths were optimized
using cross-validation, resulting in a L2-regularization strength of
0.36 and a L1-regularization strength of 2.78.
4.2 Character-level Convolutional Network
To investigate the efficacy of a higher capacity model, we adapt the
character-level convolutional neural network (CharCNN) architec-
ture from Zhang and LeCun [30]. CharCNNs operate on text data
directly at the character level, making them particularly powerful.
They do not require knowledge of the language’s syntactic or se-
mantic structure nor the specification of a representation (such as
words or n-grams). In particular, we use the small architecture de-
scribed in Zhang and LeCun [30], and we modify the architecture
by replacing the one-hot encoding of the characters with a learned
character embedding layer of identical dimensionality. Table 2 sum-
marizes the neural network architecture we use.
We use cross entropy loss as the cost function for training over
a total of 10 epochs, using the Adam optimizer with a learning
rate of 0.001 [15]. The character vocabulary size was set to 300
(i.e., character tokens not among the 300 most frequently occurring
characters were ignored), and the text window size was set to 100
(file names were truncated to length 100). Both are reasonable per
Figure 2 and Figure 1, as these settings capture most of data.
Table 2: CharCNN architecture. The network consists of
three sections: (1) a character embedding section, which re-
places the one-hot encoding from Zhang and LeCun [30], (2)
a convolution section, and, (3) a fully connected section. Rec-
tified linear units (ReLU) are used as non-linearities after
each layer, with the exception of the last layer, and 0.5 prob-
ability dropout is used after the first two fully connected lay-
ers.
Layer Feature / Output Kernel Pool
Embedding 1 300
Convolutional
2 256 7 3
3 256 7 3
4 256 3
5 256 3
6 256 3
7 256 3 3
Fully Connected
8 1024
9 1024
10 2
4.2.1 Combining File Names with Ember Features. We also evalu-
ate fusing file names with the original EMBER features. For this
experiment, we use a two hidden layer multi-layer perceptron,
where the number of nodes in each hidden layer is equal to the
dimensionality of the input data (i.e., 3375 nodes). ReLU [20] is
used as the non-linearity, and each hidden layer is followed by
batch normalization[13]. As input data, we concatenate the origi-
nal EMBER features with the file name embeddings learned by the
CharCNN (i.e., the output of layer 9 from Table 2).
5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we examine and discuss our results. For comparison,
metrics for the LightGBM model released with the EMBER data set
and pre-trained on the original features are reported in Table 3 [2,
14]. We do not expect malware detectors based solely on file names
to perform as well as the LightGBM model trained on the original
features in the data set, as those features contain information from
file contents extracted with domain knowledge of the PE file format.
This makes the EMBER features more information rich than the
file name alone. We emphasize that the goal of this work is to
demonstrate a method that could be used in parsimonious situations
where file contents may not be available to inspect.
Table 3: Metrics for the LightGBM model released with the
EMBER dataset and pre-trained on the original EMBER fea-
tures.
Precision Recall F1-score
Benign 0.99 0.99 0.99
Malware 0.99 0.98 0.98
Average 0.99 0.99 0.99
5.1 Logistic Regression Results
Table 4 and Table 5 summarize the logistic regression results. As
expected, L1-regularized logistic regression performs slightly bet-
ter than its L2-regularized counterpart. A comparison with Table 3
shows that, while the performance of logistic regression on file
name character 3-grams is not as strong as the LightGBM model
trained on a wider set of features, performance remains very com-
petitive. Specifically, the L1-regularized logistic regression on file
names alone maintained 92% of the accuracy achieved by the Light-
GBM model, as measured by average F1-score. This alone validates
the notion that file names have valuable information for prediction.
Figure 3 shows the receiver operating characteristic for logistic
regression, where the AUC is 0.97 for both regularization schemes.
Table 4: Metrics for the L1-regularized logistic regression on
file name character 3-grams.
Precision Recall F1-score
Benign 0.89 0.95 0.92
Malware 0.94 0.86 0.90
Average 0.91 0.90 0.91
Table 5: Metrics for the L2-regularized logistic regression on
file name character 3-grams.
Precision Recall F1-score
Benign 0.88 0.95 0.91
Malware 0.94 0.84 0.89
Average 0.91 0.90 0.90
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Figure 3: Receiver operating characteristics.
The logistic regression weights can also be examined to uncover
the character 3-grams most indicative of both benign and malicious
files. Table 6 shows the most indicative features for both classes. We
note no obvious indicators of maliciousness in the features shown
to be the most predictive of malware. If we had not removed strings
containing vir, mal, and hack, they would have dominated this
list of features. Accordingly, we have reasonable confidence in our
removal of severe information leakage.
Table 6: Character 3-grams most indicative of benign files
and most indicative of malware, based on learned L1-
regularized logistic regression weights.
Features
Benign ‘en/’, ‘ub3’, ‘.so’, ‘WAX’, ‘ i0’, ‘pyd’, ‘.fi’
‘xes’, ‘sdm’, ‘.ef’, ‘sp7’, ‘.mu’, ‘.oc’, ‘1b.’, ‘jpl’
Malware ‘Ac.’, ‘tdL’, ‘kns’, ‘xtC’, ‘cpS’, ‘Pe ’, ‘MsU’,
‘pym’, ‘ 1.’, ‘nd3’, ‘UBU’, ‘ .e’, ‘bi ’, ‘HMD’
5.2 Character-level Convolutional Network
Results
Table 7 summarizes the results of the CharCNN based solely on file
names. A comparison with Table 3 shows that, while the perfor-
mance of the CharCNN is not as strong as that of the LightGBM
model trained on a wider set of features, the CharCNN achieves
96% of the accuracy achieved by the LightGBM, as measured by av-
erage F1-score. Figure 3 shows the receiver operating characteristic
for the CharCNN model where the AUC is 0.99. A comparison with
Table 4 and Table 5 indicates that the CharCNN improves upon
logistic regression across all metrics.
The results align with our expectations that EMBER’s original
domain knowledge features would provide the best performance,
Table 7: Character-level convolutional neural network met-
rics.
Precision Recall F1-score
Benign 0.94 0.96 0.95
Malware 0.95 0.93 0.94
Average 0.95 0.94 0.95
though the CharCNN’s accuracy is more than sufficient to warrant
the method’s application to the use-cases we are interested in. A
relatively high AUC of 0.985 implies that, in a rate-limited situa-
tion, the method will ensure security professionals will have the
opportunity to process most all malware before most benign files.
An F1-score of 0.95 is similarly encouraging, and we argue that this
method would be a strong IOC for investigative use, particularly in
data-constrained situations.
At prediction time, the CharCNN takes on average 1.69 millisec-
onds of processor time to label a batch of 64 using a single NVIDIA
Tesla V100 GPU.
5.3 Combining File Names with Ember Features
Table 8 summarizes the results from combining the CharCNN em-
bedded file names with the original EMBER features using a MLP.
As shown below, the method maintains an average F1-score of 0.97,
with an absolute improvement of 0.02 compared to the original
CharCNN method discussed previously (see Table 7). At first im-
pression, fusing these two feature vectors improves the method and
approaches the performance of LightGBM on the original features
(see Table 3).
Table 8: Metrics for MLP trained on the original EMBER fea-
tures, combined with the CharCNN embedded file names as
additional features.
Precision Recall F1-score
Benign 0.96 0.98 0.97
Malware 0.98 0.95 0.96
Average 0.97 0.97 0.97
For completeness, we also train the same neural network archi-
tecture on just the original EMBER features. This method performs
similarly to the LightGBM, with an F1-score of 0.99, as shown in
Table 9. Therefore, including the CharCNN embeddings actually
reduced the effectiveness and accuracy of our model!
Table 9:Metrics forMLP trained on only the original EMBER
features.
Precision Recall F1-score
Benign 0.99 0.99 0.99
Malware 0.98 0.99 0.99
Average 0.99 0.99 0.99
This result suggests that the file names provide no additional
predictive value compared to information that can be parsed out
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of the binaries and used as features. Whatever information that is
leaked into the name about the file’s nature (benign/malicious) is
simply a redundant and noisy version of information available in
the binary. As this version of the information is of increased noise,
it is less reliable when used by the neural network, and thus reduces
overall performance.
This contrasts with the results reported in Kyadige et al. [17],
who found file paths combined with file features improved accu-
racy. We have two hypothesis that could explain this result. First,
the complete file path may contain more information than just file
names and is thus more reliable. We do not suspect this fully ex-
plains the difference, as the feature vector for file path context is
only 100 dimensions and does not contain the full path in its origi-
nal form.
Our second hypothesis is that the file-based features used by [17]
simply do not contain the same level of information as the extracted
features used in the EMBER corpus. They use the same feature ap-
proach as the seminal work by Saxe and Berlin [26], which uses a
histogram of entropy values, a histogram of string lengths, a his-
togram of entropy standard deviations, and 256 dimensional bin
to hash values extractable from the PE-header. This last set of 256
features will have collisions, as it corresponds to feature-hashing
into a small dimensional space. The 2,351 EMBER features have
these histograms, in addition to keeping the domain knowledge
explicitly represented with their own features, avoiding unneces-
sary disambiguation. It seems more likely that their improvement
is subsequently a function of re-introducing a (noisy) version of
information that was lost due to unnecessary feature hashing.
5.4 Interpretation of Results
Our results show that file names can contain predictive information
about its nature (benign/malicious). While there is not necessarily
an inherent relationship between malware and the name of the file
it lives in, information about malware status likely leaks into the
file name as a result of how the malware programmer chooses the
file name. This suggests that screening files using file names may be
effective in certain situations and would be valuable when it is not
computationally feasible to run a full malware analysis on all of the
data. Additionally, the use of file names to flag potentially malicious
software is useful in situations where access to the underlying file
is restricted. For example, an analyst may be in an environment
with highly sensitive data or may be using tools that do not include
access to or do not store original files.
We note two main limitations of our analysis. First, the EMBER
data set is considered a relatively easy data set where, as shown in
Table 3, 99% accuracy can be achieved using out of the box features
and tree-based gradient boosting algorithms.
Second, a malware detector of this type would be very easy to
evade from an adversarial machine learning perspective, as the ma-
licious attacker has considerably less constraints when modifying
file names than when modifying the actual file contents. In par-
ticular, the attacker does not need to ensure that, post-adversarial
perturbation, the file still behaves as intended when modifying just
the file name. This may not be as debilitating to our approach as
it first sounds - the effort required to evade our approach may not
be worthwhile to attackers. As our approach would not cover the
majority of cases nor replace anti-virus detection on endpoints, it is
most useful specialized and niche cases. Second, many applications
of our method are for the prioritization of files by a more com-
plete anti-virus system later. As such, it may be possible to deploy
a Multi-Armed Bandit approach to adapt to multiple different sam-
pling strategies (e.g., our file name approach and random sampling),
and use the more complete anti-virus results to determine which
sampling strategy is performing best. This depends on the assump-
tion of down-stream systems being more robust, which we argue
is a reasonable assumption, leaving more complete evaluation to
future work.
6 QUALITATIVE EVALUATION
It may seem unusual or surprising to some that file names are so
predictive of malicious behavior. Thus, it is desirable to investigate
our model beyond the cursory evaluation of test set accuracy. Is it
possible that data biases result in simple file names being repeated
across training and testing data? Are there real systemic flaws or
patterns in file naming conventions that are exploitable, or does
one of the classes exhibit a degenerate naming convention that
makes it trivially separable from the other class? We investigate
these questions using unsupervised visualization and clustering
techniques, and conclude that there is no obvious systemic issue
leading to inflated accuracy scores. It appears that there are indeed
patterns in file naming behaviors that are leaked by software design
and development, which we can leverage in the aforementioned
use cases.
For this qualitative exploration, we note that the CharCNN’s
penultimate fully connected layer’s output can be viewed as an
embedding of the file names (where benign files and malware are
hopefully well separated). After training, we compute this embed-
ding for all of the training data and compress the representation
from 1,024 dimensions to 2 dimensions using a Uniform Manifold
Approximation and Projection (UMAP). A popular tool for visual-
ization of high dimensional data and for general non-linear dimen-
sion reduction, UMAP is a manifold learning technique constructed
from a theoretical framework based in Riemannian geometry and
algebraic topology [19].
Figure 4 visualizes the UMAP of CharCNN learned embeddings
on the training data. We note a couple of dense and well-separated
malicious clusters and a general trend toward benign and malicious
files having homogeneous neighbors. However, the UMAP embed-
ding should not be taken as absolute truth as to the nature of the
data.
To further examine the properties of the data, we also cluster
the entire training set using the CharCNN’s penultimate fully con-
nected layer’s output as a representation for the data. HDBSCAN
was used as the clustering algorithm. HDBSCAN is a density-based,
hierarchical clustering algorithm which improves upon DBSCAN
[5]. We use HDBSCAN because (1) it maintains high cluster stabil-
ity, (2) it does not require the number of clusters to be specified
beforehand, and (3) it handles outlier detection naturally.
HDBSCAN found 9,051 clusters in the training data, with 32% of
the data labeled as noise with respect to the defined clusters. The
true label breakdown of the data points tagged as noise was 111,378
benign and 41,112 malicious. By creating UMAP embeddings of
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Figure 4: Visualization of UMAP of CharCNN learned em-
beddings on the training data. The data was compressed
using UMAP from 1,024 dimensions to 2 dimensions. The
UMAP embedding was computed using the entire training
dataset, and every 50th data point was plotted in this figure.
individual clusters, we can gain further insight into the behavior of
our models. For example, we plot clusters of three different types in
Figure 5, one containing all benign files, one containing all malicious
files, and one with a mix.
In Figure 5a we see CharCNN has isolated a naming scheme that
is apparently used by one type of malware. This particular type of
malware names itself to pose as a backup program, preceded with a
random character sequence. The behavior is simple to understand
and follow. In Figure 5b we see a cluster with mixed membership
that exhibits a wider array of behaviors. Here, a number of file
names have varying degrees of human legibility, transitioning from
legible names, to long names that are still legible, to illegibly long
names of random characters. Last, we have a cluster of only benign
files in Figure 5c. While hard to read, this cluster contains file names
that are inordinately long and random. Themajority of file names ei-
ther end in .bin or in a pattern of dashes with a temp file name, such
as 2-260890ee-19ff-4deb-924f-e1adcd4f74ff.dtm00008.temp.
Manual investigation of a number of the clusters in the corpus re-
veal a diversity of patterns and behaviors.
6.1 Quantifying Cluster Properties and
Behavior
It is not possible to manually inspect all clusters, and we would like
to evaluate their quality in a more quantifiable and empirical man-
ner. In considering the quality of our clustering, we do not expect
(or even desire) that only two clusters emerge, one for malicious
and one for benign. In fact, this would be a degenerate situation,
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Figure 5: UMAP embeddings of different clusters foundwith
HDBSCAN, all plots share the same legend. File names have
been placed next to data points to illustrate embedding con-
tent (file names selected randomly, with minor removals to
improve legibility).
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indicating that the file names in our data are globally homogeneous.
This does not align with our expectation that many different types
of file names will occur in practice. Therefore, we are concerned
primarily with the metric of Homogeneity as proposed by Rosen-
berg and Hirschberg [24], where Homogeneity is measured as the
conditional entropy of the class distribution, given the proposed
clustering (i.e., H (C |K), where C is the class labels and K the clus-
tering). Homogeneity is maximized (H (C |K) = 1) when all clusters
contain only one class and minimized when classes are uniformly
distributed within each cluster ((H (C |K) = 0).
The clustering, where outliers are not considered a cluster, achieves
a high homogeneity score of 0.916.
This indicates that most of our data is well-grouped and that
there are numerous different observable patterns in file naming,
which aligns with our expectations.
Figure 6 shows cluster size as a function of cluster maliciousness
(i.e., the fraction of the cluster members labeled as malware). We
note that the largest clusters, and most of the clusters overall, tend
to be more homogeneous (mostly benign or mostly malicious).
We also note that the grid-like pattern near the bottom of the
y-axis is caused by a finite number of small cluster sizes, where
only a discrete number of possible fractions can be achieved. The
distribution becomes less rigid as cluster size increases.
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Figure 6: The top figure shows a scatter plot of cluster ma-
liciousness (fraction of the cluster members labeled as mal-
ware) and size. The size is log scale, and the clustering was
found usingHDBSCAN on the CharCNN’s learned represen-
tation of the training data. The bottom figure shows a his-
togram of cluster maliciousness.
The homogeneous results captured by Figure 6 show many per-
fectly homogeneous clusters. This urges an analysis of cluster com-
position to ensure the results are valid. In particular, if clusters
correspond to a repeated file name within each cluster, there would
be concerns around data quality. Since file names come from user
submissions to Virus Total, this is a valid concern.
Figure 7: For each cluster, we computed the proportion of
cluster members that correspond to the most frequently oc-
curring file name in that cluster. This figure shows a his-
togram of the proportions.
For each cluster, we computed the proportion of cluster members
that correspond to the most frequently occurring file name in that
cluster. Figure 7 shows a histogram of the proportions. It can be
observed that the distribution of proportions is somewhat uniform,
suggesting that while there are clusters that correspond mostly
to a single file name, there are also more diverse clusters as well.
Overall, this indicates that the majority of perfect clusters are not
caused by simple, exact duplication of file names. We note that our
expectation is that some exact duplication should exist. Multiple
versions of the same program should have the same name, which
would naturally create duplication. A malware author may also use
file names of common applications (e.g., Safari, Chrome, Internet
Explore), in order to trick victims into running malicious binaries.
Thus, duplication in and of itself is not a concern, given the amount
of duplication is reasonable and would not prevent generalization.
We also investigate if a relationship exists between cluster dupli-
cation proportion and both cluster size and cluster maliciousness,
as shown in Figure 8 in Figure 9 respectively. Here, cluster mali-
ciousness is defined as the fraction of the cluster members labeled
as malware. Figure 8 and Figure 9 do not indicate any particular
relationship between the proportion of cluster members that cor-
respond to the most frequently occurring file name and cluster
size/maliciousness.
The presence of clusters with high proportions of members cor-
responding to the most frequently occurring file name urges the
evaluation of the effectiveness of a naive classifier. Here, a naive
classifier, during inference, would simply look for an instance of
that file name in the training set. If an instance of the file name
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Figure 8: For each cluster, we computed the proportion of
cluster members that correspond to the most frequently oc-
curring file name in that cluster. This figure examines the
proportion as a function of cluster size.
Figure 9: For each cluster, we computed the proportion of
cluster members that correspond to the most frequently oc-
curring file name in that cluster. This figure examines the
proportion as a function of cluster maliciousness.
exists in the training set, the corresponding label is used as the pre-
diction. If an instance of the file name is not found in the training
set, the naive classifier returns the label “unseen.”
Figure 10 captures the behaviour of the naive classifier in the
form of a confusion matrix, and Table 10 summarizes the classifica-
tion metrics. We note the high precision but low recall of this naive
look up approach. The high precision indicates that if a file name
was already seen in the training data, a look up can be quite effec-
tive. However, memorizing the training data alone is not sufficient,
as the majority of the file names in the test data were not present in
the training data. This drives the low recall metrics. Furthermore,
this suggests that the high predictive performance achieved by the
CharCNN and logistic regression is not due to the memorization of
the training data alone.
Figure 10: Confusion matrix evaluating the effectiveness of
a naive classifier that, at test time, simply looks for an in-
stance of the test file name in the training set. If an instance
of the file name exists in the training set, the corresponding
training label is used as the prediction. If an instance of the
file name is not found in the training set, the naive classifier
returns the label “unseen.”
Table 10: Metrics for a naive classifier that, at test time, sim-
ply looks for an instance of the test file name in the training
set, using the corresponding label as a prediction.
Precision Recall F1-score
Benign 0.90 0.52 0.66
Malware 0.98 0.23 0.37
Average 0.94 0.38 0.52
7 CONCLUSION
In this work, we examined the predictive value of file names for
malware detection. We established that file names can contain infor-
mation predictive of malware, and we demonstrated the effective-
ness of a character-level convolutional deep learning architecture
for the task. We further validated this efficacy through qualitative
study of our data and learning methods.
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